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I develop a theoretical model of ￿rms￿sourcing decisions along the pro-
ductivity dimension as in AntrÆs and Helpman (2004), while also incorporat-
ing task trade as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The combination
of these two e⁄ects permits a framework for sourcing strategies along two di-
mensions, which generates results where ￿rms spread the production process
of the ￿nal good over several di⁄erent sources simultaneously. While repro-
ducing the results from the aforementioned models, my model contributes
re￿ned and more detailed predictions. Testing these on ￿rm-level data for
Spanish manufacturing ￿rms, I ￿nd strong empirical support for the model￿ s
predictions.
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971 Introduction
Over the last decades there has been a disintegration of industrial production, in
the sense that the production chain increasingly has been split up and undertaken
at separate locations outside of the ￿rm￿ s own production plants in the home coun-
try. This disintegration can take the form of domestic outsourcing where ￿rms buy
inputs or services from other companies in the same country, or they may acquire
these from subsidiaries or from unrelated companies abroad. All of these forms
of external sourcing seem to be increasing (Feenstra, 1998; Hummels et al., 2001;
Antr￿s and Helpman, 2004, 2008 and others). There are several explanations of
these trends, but global integration seems to be a common denominator for most
of them. Lower transportation costs have made it more pro￿table to produce inter-
mediate inputs away from the assembly plant, and the technological advances has
made it possible to undertake certain accounting, engineering, and programming
services anywhere in the world. Further, cheaper and easier communication has
facilitated a closer contact between headquarters and production plants when it
comes to sending plans, giving instructions, etc.
The international trade literature has attempted to explain this development.
Departing from the explanations of Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) of
how ￿rms sort into di⁄erent forms of accessing foreign markets for ￿nal goods con-
sumption according to productivity levels, Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) develop
a similar framework for explaining which kind of sourcing ￿rms will choose, de-
pending on their productivity levels. In a model where headquarter-services are
produced in-house, but manufacturing is undertaken elsewhere, they show how
incomplete contracts between the ￿nal-good producers and the producers of inter-
mediate inputs may distort the quantity and quality of inputs away from optimal
levels, thus a⁄ecting variable costs of production. These distortions may be re-
duced with vertically integrated plants, but the ￿xed costs of establishing such
plants are higher than the costs associated with arm￿ s-length outsourcing. More
productive ￿rms with larger production will be able to spread these ￿xed costs
over more units, and will thus choose to vertically integrate production.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) argue that ￿rms make ￿ make or buy￿deci-
sions, based on a trade-o⁄ between transaction costs of outsourcing associated
98with searching and incomplete contracts, against governance costs of vertical in-
tegration. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) extend this reasoning, while ap-
proaching the topic from a slightly di⁄erent angle. They propose a theory that
views the production of ￿nal goods as a series of tasks that have to be done to
complete the product. They assume that tasks can be ordered according the their
o⁄shoring costs. These costs may be due to transportation, moral hazard prob-
lems, the importance of personal delivery of the tasks, or a combination of these
or other reasons. The important assumption is that o⁄shoring costs di⁄er between
tasks, and that these can be ordered in a non-decreasing manner. As with Antr￿s
and Helpman, wages abroad are lower than in the home country, and ￿rms will
take advantage of this for all the tasks that can be undertaken cheaper abroad than
at home. In their discussion, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg focus on di⁄erences
in skill intensities between industries, and the wage e⁄ects in the home country,
rather than ￿rm heterogeneity and selection into o⁄shoring.
In this paper I combine the strength of both approaches in order to present a
theoretical model that represents the actual sourcing strategies of ￿rms more accu-
rately than the previous literature has done. Starting from a model similar to that
one of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), I introduce the task-dimension from Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). This allows me to map ￿rms￿sourcing strategies along
both the ￿rms￿productivity and the tasks￿outsourceability, which generates pre-
dictions where ￿rms use a combination of the available sourcing options available,
both domestically and abroad. Apart from being a much more realistic repre-
sentation of ￿rms￿real sourcing strategies, this mapping generates more detailed
predictions than the previously mentioned literature. The model reproduces the
predictions from Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) that only the most productive ￿rms
will source inputs from vertically integrated plants abroad through foreign direct
investment (FDI), the somewhat less productive will source through arm￿ s-length
contracts with ￿rms abroad. Even less productive ￿rms will integrate domesti-
cally, and the least productive ￿rms will buy inputs through arm￿ s-length dealings
with other domestic ￿rms. However, I also show that ￿rms will use several sourc-
ing options simultaneously. Even the most productive ￿rms may buy some inputs
through arm￿ s-length dealings domestically. Instead of sorting ￿rms into four types
depending on which sourcing option they use, my model predicts the intensities
99with which each sourcing option is used as functions of output levels, or produc-
tivity.
Firm-level data from extensive surveys among Spanish manufacturing ￿rms
permits detailed testing of the theoretical predictions. With speci￿c questions
about the intensities in the use of each of the possible sourcing options, the data
contain much more detailed information on ￿rms￿sourcing strategies than other,
similar data sources. The empirical testing shows that the model to a large degree
seems to describe the actual relationship between output levels, productivity, and
sourcing strategies.
2 The model
In this section I develop a theoretical model in an attempt to explain why di⁄erent
￿rms choose di⁄erent sourcing strategies. It is important to note that I use sourcing
option to identify the source which a ￿rm uses to undertake a speci￿c task, whereas
by sourcing strategy I consider the entire mix of di⁄erent sources that the ￿rm uses
in the entire production. The empirical evidence in section 3 shows that about
half of the ￿rms in my sample use more than one sourcing option, meaning that
a framework that allows for combinations of several di⁄erent sourcing options is
necessary for a realistic discussion about ￿rm organization.
The economic environment in the model is common in the international trade
literature, and I will not dwell with equilibrium conditions in the ￿nal goods mar-
ket. Products are di⁄erentiated along the lines of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), and het-
erogeneous ￿rms enter and exit as in Melitz (2003).












where ￿j denotes the share of total spending the consumer uses on varieties from
industry j, qj (i) is consumed quantum of variety i in industry j, and ￿j￿(0;1) is the
degree of product di⁄erentiation between varieties in the industry. The constant
elasticity of substitution in industry j can thus be denoted ￿j = 1
1￿￿j > 1. This
100familiar setup yields inverse demand functions,




From the individual ￿rm￿ s point of view, Aj is taken as constant, and expresses














1￿￿j di is the price index over
all varieties of good j, weighted by their share in consumption from industry j.
This means that revenue for the ￿rm can be denoted




In the following I drop subscripts for industries and individual ￿rms as it is the
heterogeneity between ￿rms within the same industry that is the main focus of
this paper.
Potential entrants to the industry may enter by sinking a ￿xed cost of entry fe.
This permits the ￿rm to draw its productivity level ￿ from a known distribution
over (0;1). The productivity level can be thought of as a total factor productivity
(TFP), meaning that it works as a multiplier of the production process to deter-
mine total output. The production process is a Leontief-type technology, where a
measure of di⁄erent tasks all have to be undertaken in ￿xed amounts, here nor-
malized to one. There are no possibilities of substitution between tasks. In the
following I will use x to denote the number of times the entire production process
is undertaken, which means that total output will be this production intensity,
multiplied by the TFP
q = ￿x:
I assume that all tasks are undertaken outside the limits of the headquarters,
but may either take place in vertically integrated plants or be bought through
arm￿ s-length outsourcing. Both sourcing options are available in the home country
101N, or abroad in country S. In sum there are thus four di⁄erent sourcing options
for the ￿rm:
Domestic Integrated (NI) Domestic Outsourcing (NO)
Foreign Integrated, FDI (SI) Foreign Outsourcing (SO)
Since all of the tasks have to be completed once in order to run the production






k (!)d!; k = fO;Ig; l = fN;Sg:
Each sourcing option implies some ￿xed costs, as well as the variable costs of pro-
duction. In the case of vertically integrated plants, these ￿xed costs are naturally
related to the investment costs of building the plant and buying the necessary
machinery. For arm￿ s-length outsourcing, the ￿xed costs could be searching costs
to ￿nd an appropriate provider, training of workers, and testing to ensure that
tasks are undertaken at an acceptable quality level. Further, I assume that any
such ￿xed costs associated with either vertically integrated plants or outsourc-
ing, are higher when done abroad instead of domestically. This can be explained
through lack of knowledge about legal systems, local markets, language barriers,
etc. In sum, I follow most of the relevant literature and assume that the ￿xed
costs associated with sourcing strategies, fl










The ￿xed costs have to be paid for each individual task that is done within or
outside the limits of the ￿rm. This di⁄erentiates my model from Antr￿s and Help-
man (2004), where once the ￿xed costs for a sourcing option are paid, the entire
production process can be undertaken there. This is indeed also what happens,
since their model never gives ￿rms incentives to split the production process, as
they will always choose the sourcing option with the lowest marginal costs in pro-
duction, given that their production justi￿es the ￿xed costs associated with this
option. There will never be incentives to split part of the production from another
1See for example AntrÆs and Helpman (2004), Helpman (2006), and others.
102source with higher marginal costs, and in addition have to pay another ￿xed cost.
My motivation for assuming that there are ￿xed costs associated with each task
in the production process is both theoretically and empirically motivated. Firms
that choose to outsource tasks will seldom ￿nd a provider that can deliver the best
o⁄er for all tasks, and may thus have to pay search costs for providers for each
task. This is de￿nitely the case when ￿rms buy inputs from di⁄erent countries,
as is the case with the production of a typical "American" car, which is simulta-
neously produced in the United States (37%), Korea (30%), Japan (17.5%), Ger-
many (7.5%), Taiwan (4%), Singapore (4%), the United Kingdom (2.5%), Ireland
(1.5%), and Barbados (1.5%) (Antr￿s and Helpman, 2004). Similarly, Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) report that the production of the Boeing 787 involves
43 suppliers, producing at 135 sites worldwide.







￿ ￿ xc(s) ￿ f (x)
￿
: (2)
Here, the ￿rst term is the revenue term derived above, the second term expresses
the variable costs, and the last term denotes the ￿xed cost associated with all
the tasks that have to be performed. It will become clear later that the optimal
sourcing strategy s is a function of x, which means that both the variable costs,
and the "￿xed" costs depend on the equilibrium production intensity. The ￿rst
























@x, which relation will become clear at a later stage. This
condition yields a speci￿c expression for neither production intensity x￿, nor output
￿x￿. It does, however, implicitly de￿ne these identities, and I assume that ￿rms
are able to derive their optimal production levels from this condition. It can
also be shown that as long as the second-order conditions for pro￿t maximization
hold, more productive ￿rms will produce at a higher intensity, @x
@￿ > 0, and thus
also
@q
@￿ > 0. The proof of this is relegated to Appendix A2. This shows that
although the cost structure in the model is di⁄erent from the Melitz model, the
103key results come through. It also means that all the qualitative relations between
production intensity x and sourcing strategies that I discuss below will also hold
for productivity and sourcing strategies.
Knowing its optimal production intensity, the ￿rm will chose a sourcing strat-
egy in order to maximize pro￿ts. In the following I will make the simplifying
assumption that the impact of an individual task on the optimal production is
negligible, so that ￿rms will disregard the output e⁄ect from switching from one
sourcing option to another for a given task.
As discussed above, all tasks can potentially be undertaken either in the north
or in the south. The variable costs of production in each place will naturally
depend on wages in the respective countries. I assume that wages are lower in the
south than in the north, wN > wS, as otherwise no ￿rm will ever chose to have any
tasks done abroad. If the di⁄erence in ￿xed costs between vertical integration and
outsourcing is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent between home and abroad, it will also be










, which is a condition I will assume
to hold for simplicity throughout the paper.
All of a measure of tasks must be undertaken in order produce ￿nal products.
These tasks can be ordered according to their degree of outsourceability.2 The
intuition behind this is that tasks can be ordered according to how standardized,
or ￿ codi￿able,￿they are. Some tasks are easier to de￿ne in writing, thus making
it easier both to give clear instructions to workers in spite the lack of physical
proximity, and lowering the possibility of moral hazard-related problems due to
contract incompleteness.3 I denote the ad valorem costs of producing outside the
limits of the ￿rm by t(!). The total costs associated with each sourcing strategy
2Note that this di⁄ers from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), who assume that tasks
di⁄er in terms of o⁄shoreability instead of outsourceability.
3I will not specify the bargaining problem from incomplete contracts in this paper. Rather, I
just assume that tasks can be ordered according to their degree of outsourceability. For a more
speci￿c discussion on the form of moral hazard and bargaining in the outsourcing literature, see
for example Antr￿s (2003; 2005), Antr￿s and Helpman (2004; 2007), and Acemoglu et al. (2007).






































which states that for any level of outsourceability ! and optimal production in-
tensity, the ￿rm will choose the cheapest available sourcing option. Since there
are no externalities in production between the tasks, the ￿rm will naturally chose
the sourcing strategy for each task that minimizes total costs for that speci￿c task
individually, without taking sourcing decisions for other tasks into consideration.
I can thus solve for the optimal sourcing strategy for a ￿rm with total production
x￿ (￿) through pairwise comparisons between all possible sourcing options for all
tasks.
When production is close to zero, domestic outsourcing will always be the
preferred source for all tasks, since this is the option with the lowest ￿xed costs.
However, as production increases, sourcing options with lower variable costs may
justify paying higher ￿xed costs. These di⁄erences in variable costs means that
for each pair of sourcing options, there will be a cuto⁄ value for ! = !0 below
which one sourcing option will be preferred over the other for all tasks !￿[0;!0),
and contrary for all tasks, !, above this level.4 Compare for example, the costs
of outsourcing domestically (NO) with those of vertically integrating domestically
(NI). With ￿xed costs ranked as assumed above, it is easy to see that for low values
of t(!) NO is preferable to NI. As the costs of outsourcing increase, however, this
order will be reversed. Since t(!) is monotonically increasing in !, there will be
4The one exception to this is the comparison between domestic and foreign vertical integration,
as these are both independent of outsourceability. There are still di⁄erences in marginal costs
between these, but the preferred option will solely be determined by the production quantity.
105a value ! = !NONI for which the ￿rm will be indi⁄erent between choosing NO or













Similarly, cuto⁄-values for ! for all pairwise rankings can be derived to be:6





























From these conditions one can also see that the cuto⁄ outsourceability levels are
dependent on x. This means that the optimal sourcing strategy for larger ￿rms will
be di⁄erent from that of smaller ￿rms. This is quite intuitive, as larger ￿rms will
bene￿t more from reductions in variable costs, as there are more units over which
the ￿xed costs can be spread. The story here is analogous to the exporting models
in Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), where large ￿rms can spread ￿xed
costs over more units, and as such will opt for strategies with lower variable costs
than smaller ￿rms will. While the aforementioned papers study market access
strategies for ￿nal goods, the story is similar for trade and investments in tasks,
or intermediate inputs.
So far I have only determined conditions for pairwise comparisons of sourcing
options. In order to get a complete mapping for which sourcing strategies a ￿rm
will opt for given production x, I need to determine simultaneous preference order-
5I denote these indi⁄erence loci of ! such that for ! < !ab ! a ￿ b.
6The ranking of domestic integration (NI) versus foreign integration (SI) is naturally inde-
pendent of !, as ! indicate the outsourceability of a given task.
106ings between all sourcing options. Since all the cuto⁄-values of ! are functions of
x, it is possible to determine for which production levels a given cuto⁄ ! is larger
than another cuto⁄, i.e. when it is the case that for example !NONI > !NOSI.













There exists a value for x that ensures that the above holds with equality:




wN ￿ wS = xNOSINONI:
This means that for ￿rms with optimal production intensity x￿ > xNOSINONI,
the cuto⁄ point !NONI comes for a higher value of ! than for !NOSI.7 Similarly
all pairwise comparisons of these cuto⁄-values can be expressed as functions of
x. These sets of pairwise comparisons let me construct a complete mapping of
sourcing strategies for ￿rms. In the following I derive the determinants of the
sourcing strategies for small ￿rms as an illustrative example. A more complete
presentation of this process can be found in Appendix A3.
It turns out that many of the cuto⁄values of x coincide, and as a result, there
are ￿ve categories of ￿rms, according to size. In each category the ranking of cuto⁄
levels for ! de￿nes which sourcing option will be preferred for di⁄erent intervals
over !. Take for example the case of the smallest ￿rms. For these ￿rms it will be
the case that
!SONI < !NONI < !SOSI < !NOSI < !NOSO:
This means that for the tasks that are cheapest to outsource, !￿[0;!NISO), the
result of all pairwise comparisons of sourcing options will be
SO ￿ NI; NO ￿ NI; SO ￿ SI; NO ￿ SI; NO ￿ SO;
which unambiguously shows that NO, outsourcing domestically, is preferred to
any other sourcing option. Doing this for all the intervals of ! it turns out that
this option is the Condorcet-winner until ! = !NONI. This comes as no surprise,
7Similarly to the !-loci, I denote the cuto⁄ production intensities such that x < xab ! !a >
!b.
107as this is exactly the cuto⁄-value of ! where NI becomes cheaper than NO. For
this ￿rm-size category NI stays the cheapest sourcing option for all tasks with






NI for !￿[!NONI;1] if !NONI￿[0;1]
NI for !￿[0;1] if !NONI < 0
NO for !￿[0;1] if !NONI > 1
:
Note again, however, that !NONI is a function of x, meaning that the relative
intensity between the two sourcing options will di⁄er among ￿rms within the cate-




wNx is falling in x, larger ￿rms within the category
will undertake relatively more tasks in vertically integrated plants than the smaller
￿rms will. The two last sourcing strategies in the expression above are corner so-
lutions where ￿rms will choose one sourcing option for all values of x￿.8 In the rest
of this section I will focus mainly on the internal solutions to simplify notation.
Where relevant, corner solutions will be discussed in Appendix A1.
Repeating this exercise for all other categories of ￿rm sizes I can de￿ne the
cuto⁄-sizes of ￿rms that divide ￿rms in size-categories in increasing order as fol-
lows:
Category Production intensity
1 xNOSONOSI > x￿
2 xNOSOSONI > x￿ > xNOSONOSI
3 xSONINOSI > x￿ > xNOSOSONI
4 xNISI > x￿ > xSONINOSI
5 x￿ > xNISI
Within each such category the ranking of the relevant cuto⁄points for ! are clearly
determined. This permits a mapping of sourcing strategies along the dimensions
of optimal production intensity, x￿ (￿), and the cost of outsourcing, t(!), which
is depicted in Figure 1. In the ￿gure the categories are shown, separated by the
8This is only the case for su¢ ciently low levels of x. This will become apparent later in this
section.
108vertical dotted lines.
Figure 1: Sourcing strategies and productivity
It turns out that the two categories with the smallest ￿rms (1 and 2), and the
two categories with intermediate ￿rms (3 and 4) are qualitatively the same, and
these can be merged, so that I end up with three size categories of ￿rms; small,
medium, and large. The ￿gure is thus completely determined by the following loci:
t(!NONI); t(!NOSO); t(!SONI); t(!SOSI); xNOSOSONI; and xNISI. The critical
size, xNOSOSONI, determines which ￿rms engage in international sourcing and
which do not. Below this value, t(!NONI) determines the share of tasks that are
undertaken in vertically integrated plants, and which are outsourced domestically.
For ￿rm sizes between xNOSOSONI and xNISI the locus t(!NOSO) determines which
tasks are outsourced domestically, which will be the tasks with ! < !NOSO. For
these same ￿rms, tasks with !NOSO < ! < !SONI are outsourced in the foreign
country, and the tasks !SONI < ! are undertaken in vertically integrated plants
domestically. The largest ￿rms, with production xNISI < x, will again outsource
109tasks ! < !NOSO domestically and tasks !NOSO < ! < !SONI from the foreign
country. These ￿rms, however, will undertake the tasks !SOSI < ! in vertically
integrated plants abroad through FDI.
The above discussion means that within these categories the ￿rms will choose
their sourcing strategies from the following options:
Category Sourcing strategies
Small NO; NI
Medium NO; SO; NI
Large NO; SO; SI
Qualitatively there are two demarcation criteria that distinguish the categories.
The ￿rst one is that small ￿rms do not engage in international sourcing; they
undertake all tasks domestically. The second one is that among the ￿rms that do
engage in international sourcing, only the largest choose to produce in integrated
subsidiaries through FDI, whereas if the medium ￿rms choose vertical integration,
they will do so domestically. In other words, the model predicts that no ￿rms
will simultaneously undertake tasks in vertically integrated plants domestically
and internationally. The reason for this is that I have assumed no ine¢ ciencies in
contractibility etc. for vertically integrated plants, so if a ￿rm has a su¢ ciently
large production and vertical integration abroad is cheaper than vertical integra-
tion domestically for one task, this will hold for all tasks. This assumption could
be softened by introducing some distance costs associated with foreign production
￿ (!), as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), such that cS
O = t(!)￿ (!)ws
and cS
I = ￿ (!)ws. This would require either an assumption that the ordering of
tasks is such that both t(!) and ￿ (!) are monotonically increasing, or introducing
a third dimension along the ￿ (!)-axis. For simplicity, and in order to be able to
map sourcing strategies in a two-dimensional ￿gure, however, I choose to stick to
the assumption that ￿ = 1 ? !.
The variable costs of production for small, medium, and large ￿rms, respec-
110tively, can be expressed as
c(x￿)





















From the de￿nitions of the t(!)-loci it is clear that cl ￿ cm ￿ cs. (Proof is in
Appendix A1.) This implies that there are two e⁄ects that make more productive
￿rms larger than less productive ￿rms. First, there is the direct e⁄ect that more
productive ￿rms will produce each unit of output at a lower price, and thus be
more competitive and sell more units. They will also undertake the production
process more times than will less productive ￿rms. This second e⁄ect ensures that
the more productive ￿rms are able to choose cheaper sourcing strategies, which
again lowers their costs per run of the production process, and thus also per unit
costs, and further increases the size of more productive ￿rms. The sum of these
two e⁄ects would lead to a skewed distribution of ￿rm sizes, with a longer right
tail in the distribution than in the initial productivity distribution, even if the ex
ante productivity distribution should be uniform.
The model predicts that the least productive ￿rms will only engage in domestic
sourcing, whereas only the most productive ￿rms will do FDI and source from
vertically integrated ￿rms abroad. Firms with intermediate productivity levels
will outsource to the foreign country, but not do FDI. This replicates the results
from Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). However, the main contribution of this model is
in the details. Whereas it reproduces the ￿ndings of previous models, it also allows
￿rms to choose sourcing strategies involving several di⁄erent sourcing options. This
again generates predictions on the relative intensities of each sourcing option as
functions of ￿rm productivity. Looking at each sourcing option individually, the
following predictions can be derived from the model:
Prediction 1: Outsourcing in the north (NO) is a decreasing function of pro-
ductivity.






wNx2 < 0 and






(wN￿ws)x2 < 0, which means that also
@t(!NONI)
@￿ < 0 and
@t(!NOSO)
@￿ <
0, and NO is decreasing in ￿ for all ￿ 2 (0;1).
Prediction 2: Vertical integration in the north (NI) is initially increasing, and
then decreasing in productivity.
For x￿ < xNOSOSONI vertical integration in the north is equal to 1 ￿ !NONI.
Since
@t(!NONI)
@￿ < 0, it must be that
@(1￿!NONI)
@￿ > 0, and NI is increasing in







wSx2 > 0, which implies that
@t(!SONI)
@￿ > 0, and NI is
decreasing in this interval. For higher levels of productivity there will be no use
of NI.
Prediction 3: Outsourcing in the south (SO) is (initially) increasing in produc-
tivity.
For productivities that give the interval xNOSOSONI < x￿ < xNISI the share of
foreign outsourcing in a ￿rm is equal to !SONI ￿ !NOSO. We have already seen
that
@t(!SONI)
@￿ > 0 and
@t(!NOSO)
@￿ < 0, implying that
@(!SONI￿!NOSO)
@￿ > 0, but this
would be irrelevant if !SONI ￿ !NOSO < 0. It follows from the monotonicity of
t(!) that
!SONI ￿ !NOSO > 0 , t(!SONI) ￿ t(!NOSO) > 0:






wN(wN￿wS) in this interval,
yields t(!SONI)￿t(!NOSO) = 0, meaning that the share of tasks that are o⁄shored
to the foreign country starts at 0 and then increases monotonically in the interval
up to x￿ = xNISI. From this point on, the e⁄ect on SO is ambiguous. Both
@t(!NOSO)
@￿ < 0 and
@t(!SOSI)
@￿ < 0, but whether they fall at an equal pace, or whether
one falls more rapidly than the other, depends on the shape of t(￿). Without
assuming anything about this function, the prediction is thus that the relationship
between productivity and SO will initially be positive, but potentially be non-
linear.
Prediction 4: Vertical integration in the south (SI) is increasing in productivity.
112This follows simply from the fact that for ￿rms with productivity such that x￿ >
xNISI, which are the only ￿rms that will engage in SI, the share of tasks undertaken









@￿ < 0, it must be that
@(1￿!SOSI)
@￿ > 0 for these ￿rms.
The empirical literature has often focused on o⁄shoring, as this has been easier
to obtain data for, than for each sourcing option separately. Grouping SO and SI
together shows that o⁄shoring should also be clearly increasing in both production
intensity and productivity of ￿rms. One could also group NI and SI to study
whether more productive ￿rms or ￿rms with higher output levels would use more
or less vertically integrated plants to produce intermediate inputs. Here the model
has no clear predictions, as this relationship seems to be highly non-linear, but
with no apparent dominating trend. If the distribution function from which the
￿rms draw productivity is somewhat Pareto-shaped, as has been documented by
empirical studies (Del Gatto et al., 2007), the small and medium sized ￿rms would
likely dominate the total e⁄ect on the use of vertical integration.10 Taking this into
consideration, the use of vertical integration as a function of production intensity
or productivity should resemble the relationship between vertical integration in
the north and the same independent variables.
These new and more detailed predictions, compared to previous models, will
be the main focus of my empirical investigation in section 3.
2.1 Comparative statics
This mapping of sourcing strategies in a (x￿ (￿);t(!))-diagram allows for some
comparative static analysis. In the following I will show what the model predicts
for changes in wages in the north, wN.
There is a growing literature on the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on domestic wages. The
earliest arguments were that in developed, capital- and skilled labor-rich countries
￿rms would o⁄shore tasks that are intensive in the use of (low-skilled) labor, thus
reducing demand for (low-skilled) labor, and hence also wages (see for example
10A sneak peek at the data reveals that around 85% of the ￿rms in the sample are categorized
as small or medium when using the demarcation criteria from the model, indicating that these
￿rms should indeed dominate the overall e⁄ect.
113Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; 1999).11 Others argued that the increased wage gap
between high- and low-skilled labor was driven by competition from low-wage
countries, as well as technological advances (Leamer, 1996; Autor et al. 1998).
Later contributions have shown how such o⁄shoring may actually increase wages,
through either productivity gains (Girma and G￿rg, 2004; Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008; and others), or through increased bargaining power for labor
unions (Lommerud et al., 2009). The net e⁄ect on wages from o⁄shoring thus
depends heavily on which factors dominate. In this paper I will not go into this
debate, but only show how a change in wages in the north will a⁄ect sourcing
strategies for ￿rms. This will then enable me to comment on possible feedback-
e⁄ects if o⁄shoring indeed changes the home country wages. If changes in o⁄shoring
lead to changing wages, this should over time a⁄ect the ￿rms￿optimal sourcing
strategies. If it is indeed the case that increased o⁄shoring will lead to increased
wages, whereas increasing wages leads to increased o⁄shoring, then a small initial
change could potentially lead to large total e⁄ects.
As discussed above, the choice of sourcing strategies as a function of ￿rm size is
completely determined by t(!NONI), t(!NOSO), t(!SONI), t(!SOSI), xNOSOSONI,

















































11O⁄shoring is here de￿ned as undertaking tasks abroad, and thus includes both outsourcing
and vertical FDI in the south in my model.
114The changes are depicted graphically in Figure 2.
This clearly shows that an increase in wages in the north will lead to an un-
ambiguous increase in foreign sourcing if the distribution of ￿rm sizes remains
constant. This is not at all surprising, but it illustrates an important point: if it
is the case that o⁄shoring indeed increases wage levels at home, this should lead
to a circular e⁄ect where ￿rms get increased incentives to seek foreign sourcing
options. If this self-reinforcing e⁄ect is strong enough, a small increase in northern
wages could ultimately lead to all tasks being o⁄shored. This does not sound like
a likely outcome, however, and could possibly indicate that if o⁄shoring leads to
increased wages, this may only be for certain degrees of o⁄shoring. This is exactly
what is predicted in Kohler and Wrona (2010).
Figure 2: Increase in the wages in the north
3 Data and empirical strategy
In this section of the paper I will test some of the predictions generated in the
theoretical model. Due to the nature of the data, not all predictions can be
115tested, and the ones I do test should not be interpreted as causal mechanisms. It
is however a necessary, although not su¢ cient, condition for the validity of the
theoretical model that the testable predictions be re￿ ected in the data. Should
this be the case, then it would be an indication that the model cannot readily be
seen as falsi￿ed by the empirical testing, and would as such indicate some support
of the model.
The relationship between productivity and sourcing strategies has been tested
in the empirical literature before. Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008) test the predictions
from Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) on intra-￿rm trade, using
data on U.S. ￿rms￿within-industry imports from foreign a¢ liates, and ￿nd some
support for their predictions that intra-￿rm trade should be higher among ￿rms
that are intensive in their use of headquarter services. The same is also the case
for ￿rms that are skill- and capital-intensive. Corcos et al. (2008) re￿ne this re-
search using French ￿rm-level data, and include TFP measures as an explanatory
variable. Their study shows that also more productive ￿rms are more likely to
source inputs through intra-￿rm international imports. Both of these studies rely
on import data to construct their sourcing variables, which may be an imprecise
measure of sourcing, as it is hard to distinguish which imports are actually in-
termediate inputs in production. One study that avoids this problem is Tomiura
(2007). Using survey data on Japanese ￿rms, he has information directly from
￿rms on "whether they contract out manufacturing or processing tasks to other
￿rms overseas," a direct dummy for SO in my model: foreign outsourcing. His
￿ndings indicate that ￿rms that outsource to foreign countries are less productive
than ￿rms that do FDI, but more productive than domestic ￿rms. These ￿ndings
compare directly to the "predicted ￿rm sizes" from my model, and also show the
same productivity ordering that my model predicts. Federico (2010) uses Italian
survey data that includes information on all four sourcing options that I use in
my model. Measuring the productivity premium for ￿rms that use the di⁄erent
sourcing options, he concludes that ￿rms that choose foreign integration are the
most productive, and the ones choosing domestic outsourcing are the least produc-
tive. However, contrary to the predictions in my model, he claims that domestic
integration is chosen by medium-high productivity ￿rms, whereas medium-low pro-
ductivity ￿rms prefer foreign outsourcing. Kohler and Smolka (2009) use the same
116Spanish survey data as I use in this paper to study the connection between ￿rm
productivity and sourcing behavior. As I will come back to later in this chapter,
these data contain information about the intensity with which all four sourcing
options are used, as well as data that distinguishes ￿rms that are headquarters
from the ones that themselves are subsidiaries of foreign ￿rms. Interestingly, their
study concludes that the unrestricted sample, when "non-headquarter" ￿rms are
included, gives results that are in line with those in Federico (2010). However,
when studying only ￿rms that are true headquarters, and as such assumed to have
complete discretion over sourcing strategies, the productivity ordering between
￿rms that outsource to the foreign country and those that integrate domestically
is reversed and in accordance with the predictions from my model.
The data I use are acquired from the annual business survey from Fundaci￿n
SEPI.12 The survey covers about 2,000 ￿rms with more than 10 employees annually,
and report data for individual ￿rms, and not corporate groups. All ￿rms with
more than 200 employees are invited to participate, whereas a random sample of
about 5% of ￿rms with 10-200 employees are asked.13 This means that large ￿rms
are somewhat overrepresented in the sample, something I try to control for when
possible and necessary.
The main advantages of these data, compared to other ￿rm-level data, is the
detail of the information that it contains, both of the main variables of interest
and of some important control variables. As discussed above, many empirical
investigations of o⁄shoring use imports in the same SIC category as a proxy for
o⁄shoring. In the data used here the ￿rms answer direct questions about the
percentage of intermediate inputs they buy from other, related or unrelated ￿rms,
domestically and abroad. These four variables thus correspond directly to the
four sourcing options described in my theoretical model. Unfortunately these
questions have only been included in the survey for the years 2006-2008, and with
12The survey "Encuesta sobre estrategias empresariales" is conducted by Fundaci￿n Sociedad
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales. See http://www.funep.es/esee/en/einfo_que_es.asp for
more information about the foundation and the survey.
13Starting from the initial sample from 1990, SEPI has included all newly incorporated ￿rms
with more than 200 employees, and a randomly selected sample of about 5% of the newly
incorporated ￿rms with 10-200 employees. As such the large ￿rms are overrepresented in the
data, but within each group careful measures are taken to ensure the representativeness of the
data. Average response rate for 1990-2008 is an impressive 91.97%.
117little variation in sourcing strategies over such a short time period, the data do
not permit the use of panel data techniques in order to perform better tests for
causality, as well as selection- and learning-e⁄ects of di⁄erent sourcing strategies.
With the continued collection of these variables though, such investigations will
become possible in the near future. The data do however permit the use of lagged
values for productivity, as measured productivity could potentially be a⁄ected by
sourcing behavior. The results do not seem to change with either one- or two-year
lags, and only the results from running the unlagged variables are reported here.
In total my data set is a relatively balanced panel that includes information on
4,629 ￿rms from 1999 to 2008. As I only have information on my main variables
of interest since 2006, the results reported in this section are from cross-sectional
analysis for individual years between 2006-2008. The results reported here are
from 2007, but all three years show similar results. The longer time-series are
used in estimating total factor productivity for the individual ￿rms. For a more
thorough discussion of the data, see Kohler and Smolka (2009).
Making dummies for the use of each sourcing option, I get four not mutually
exclusive categories. The summary statistics show (with large ￿rms excluded in
parentheses) that 4.2% (4.8%) of the ￿rms in the survey buy no intermediate inputs
through any of the sourcing options, 92.4% (93.0%) outsource domestically, 43.1%
(34.6%) outsource from other countries, and 15.4% (8.4%) and 10.4% (3.7%) buy
inputs from vertically integrated plants in Spain and other countries, respectively.
Around 47.8% (37.4%) of the ￿rms in the sample source from more than one of
the four options every year. These values show that almost all ￿rms buy some
intermediate inputs from other ￿rms, and also shows models that predict that
￿rms will source all their input from the same provider are in discordance with the
empirical observations.
I will let the empirical part of this study follow the theoretical model as closely
as possible. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 are thus divided by predicted size
according to the size de￿nitions from the model. If a ￿rm only buys intermediate
inputs from domestic sources, it is classi￿ed as small. Firms that do buy inputs
through arm￿ s-length dealings with independent ￿rms abroad (SO), but do not
undertake FDI and produce in vertically integrated plants abroad, are categorized
as medium, and ￿nally ￿rms that have vertically integrated plants abroad are
118classi￿ed as large. The summary statistics for each of these categories are shown
below.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the main variables I will focus on in this section, for each
size group and for the sample average. The ￿rst thing we notice is that OUT-
PUT, de￿ned as the sum of sales plus the variation in inventory, in millions of
Euros, corresponds well to the predicted size categories from the model, with the
￿ medium￿￿rms producing a little less than the average output in the sample, while
the ￿ small￿￿rms produce around half, and the ￿ large￿￿rms produce more than four
times the average output. As predicted by the model, the PRODUCTIVITY is
also increasing in the size categories. This variable is generated with the Olley
and Pakes (1996) method, which has become the favored method of estimating
total factor productivity in the economic literature, thanks to its correction for en-
dogeneity issues related to productivity shocks and selection in the exit decisions.
Among the important control variables when studying sourcing strategies and pro-
ductivity I have also included EXPORT STATUS, which is a dummy for whether
the ￿rm is an exporter or not. This variable shows a very similar pattern to that
119of productivity, which is the familiar "Melitz-result" (2003), that more productive
￿rms will become exporters whereas less productive ￿rms will produce only for
the domestic market. The next variable, SIMILAR PRODUCT, is a dummy for
whether the main foreign a¢ liate of the ￿rm (if it has one) produces a similar prod-
uct, or in other words if the group has undertaken horizontal FDI. The rationale
for including this variable is that if a ￿rm has several production plants producing
the same product, the total production will be larger than that reported only by
the domestic ￿rm, and according to the forces at work in the theoretical model,
it will thus have more units over which to spread the ￿xed costs, and stronger
incentives to choose a sourcing option with lower marginal costs. In total only 6%
of the ￿rms produce a similar product to their main a¢ liate, but in the large ￿rm
category, 25% of the ￿rms do, indicating that this is a prominent feature among
the largest ￿rms. The next two variables show that the larger ￿rms both have
higher CAPITAL INTENSITY and R&D INTENSITY than the smaller ￿rms. I
have also included the ￿rms￿degree of CAPACITY UTILIZATION. This does not
seem to vary systematically across the di⁄erent size categories, but could have
some explanatory power over sourcing options. Speci￿cally one could expect that
￿rms would increase their domestic outsourcing when capacity utilization is very
high, as this could be the cheapest short-term solution to cover for example a tem-
porary demand shock. Finally, Table 1 shows that the predicted sizes correspond
to the actual sizes when measured in the number of EMPLOYEES.
1203.1 Results
The ￿t of predicted size categories according to the model, and real size categories,
measured in total production, is reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Predicted size versus actual ￿rm size
The actual sizes are divided into quintiles when ￿rms are sorted according to total
value of production. The second row for each predicted size category shows the
percentage of the ￿rms in this category that ￿ts in each of the actual size categories.
Reading these shares horizontally, we see that the ￿rms that are predicted to be
￿ small￿according to the theoretical model are predominantly among the small
￿rms when sorted by actual production as well. In fact, 67% of the ￿rms that are
predicted to be small according to the model fall into one of the two groups of ￿rms
with the lowest actual output. The ￿ medium￿category is quite evenly spread out
over all levels of total output, whereas the ￿ large￿category is predominant among
the ￿rms with large productions, with 74% of the ￿rms in this group falling into
the two top categories of actual output. A simple, univariate regression shows
that more than 23% of the variation in the actual company size distribution can
be explained by the predicted size categories. This gives a ￿rst indication that
121the theoretical model may capture some of the underlying mechanisms in the
real world: that the smallest, least productive ￿rms source domestically, whereas
only the most productive ￿rms choose FDI. To test the model more stringently, I
thus turn to the more speci￿c predictions of the model, which to the best of my
knowledge, has not been predicted by theoretical contributions in this literature
before.
Predictions 1-4 in section 2 stated that the intensity of each individual sourcing
option would be functions of the productivity of ￿rms. More speci￿cally, my model
predicted that outsourcing in the north would be decreasing in ￿rms￿productivity
and integration in the north would be strongly concave, whereas both outsourcing
and integration in the south would be increasing in the ￿rms￿productivity. I test
the mentioned predictions by regressing the share of intermediate inputs that the
￿rms acquire through each sourcing option on productivity measures estimated
by the Olley-Pakes method (Olley and Pakes, 1996) and the control variables dis-
cussed above, separately. These shares are bounded from below at 0% for all
sourcing options, and also from above at 100% in the case of domestic and foreign
outsourcing. I therefore use the Tobit model and censored regression to adjust for
this. The results are shown in Table 3. It may be that establishing partnerships
for outsourcing, or building integrated plants domestically or abroad, may take
some time. Further, it has also been argued that ￿rms that are controlled by for-
eigners will lack some domestic knowledge, while having superior knowledge about
their own country, and that this will a⁄ect their sourcing strategies. I thus follow
Kohler and Smolka (2009) and restrict the sample to ￿rms that have existed for
￿ve years or more, and also exclude foreign ￿rms, by which I mean ￿rms where
more than 33% of the shares are controlled by foreign shareholders.14 Since the
predicted e⁄ects of productivity on sourcing behavior are likely to be non-linear
for most forms of t(!) I include the squared term of productivity to allow for some
non-linearity of a second-degree kind. As before, the results are reported for 2007,
since these results are closest to the average results over the three years, for which
I have the relevant data, but the results for 2006 and 2008 are again practically
14Among these "foreign ￿rms," 96.51% are 50% or more controlled by foreign shareholders,
and 83.95% have at least 98% of their shares controlled by foreign shareholders. 77.11% are
100% foreign-owned. Not very surprisingly, the results do not change much when I use 50% or
100% foreign shareholding as cuto⁄-levels for de￿ning foreign ￿rms.
122identical. Regressions (1)-(4) show the tests of the predicted relationship between
PRODUCTIVITY and the respective sourcing options. The relationships do seem
to be quite non-linear. All coe¢ cients that are predicted by predictions 1-4 are
of the expected sign, and most of them are statistically signi￿cant. The e⁄ect of
PRODUCTIVITY on foreign vertical integration seems somewhat less statistically
signi￿cant than the others, but this might come from the fact that only about 200
of the ￿rms in the sample source any intermediate input through this channel.
The economic importance of these e⁄ects does also seem to be important. From
the average level of productivity, a 10% productivity increase would predict a -
1.75 percentage points change in domestic outsourcing, whereas domestic vertical
integration, foreign outsourcing and foreign vertical integration would be expected
to increase by 4.12, 4.77, and 5.26 percentage points, respectively. The main con-
clusions from studying regressions (1)-(4) however, is that none of the predictions
1-4 can be rejected. The results also show that sourcing behavior varies quite a
lot between ￿rms.
Compared to the model, there are some di⁄erences in the data. One example
is that as many as 40% of the ￿rms in this sample report sourcing percentages that
add up to less than 100%. This is not a big problem, as in the real world some ￿rms
would produce some intermediate inputs themselves, in contrast to only producing
headquarter services as assumed in the model. In-house production should best be
thought of as a form a vertical integration, and the closest equivalent to the model
would thus be to proxy NI = 100￿(NO + SO + SI). Doing this does not change
the results signi￿cantly, and I conclude that this deviation between the model and
the data is not a problem. Another issue that might be of more concern, is that
the dependent variables are connected through the substitutability between them.
This could mean that a seemingly unrelated regressions approach would yield more
e¢ cient coe¢ cients; however, the bias from a linear estimation on the truncated
data would be of more concern, and I thus prefer to run with the tobit analysis.
The tobit-model on the other hand hinges on the rather strict assumption that the
error terms are normally distributed. A test for normality after tobit estimation
derived by Skeels and Vella (1999) is thus run on regressions (2) and (4), and null
123hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected in any of these cases.15
Table 3: Productivity and sourcing behavior
For tractability and simplicity, none of the control variables in Table 3 were
incorporated in the theoretical model. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that some
of these variables have important and interesting e⁄ects on the ￿rms￿sourcing
strategies. Equation (2) showed that output is a convexly increasing function of
productivity. The relationship between productivity and EXPORT STATUS has
been widely argued in the international trade literature (see for example Clerides
et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard et al., 2003; and many others),
and strong support has been found for a selection e⁄ect that more productive ￿rms
self-select into exporting. More mixed results are found for the learning e⁄ect of
exporting, i.e. whether exporting ￿rms increase their productivity after becoming
exporters. Table 3 shows that ceteris paribus, exporters use domestic outsourcing
15The tobcm test cannot be run on regressions (1) and (3) as this test can only be used on
left-censored regressions with zero as the censoring point.
124options less intensively than non-exporters do, and use all other sourcing options
more intensively. These results may indicate that the costs of sourcing abroad may
be lower if the ￿rm already has some sales network operating abroad. Caution has
to be taken, however, as this e⁄ect may just as well be in the other direction:
that foreign outsourcing makes establishing an export network cheaper, and thus
makes exporting more likely for ￿rms that are already sourcing abroad.16 Further,
it may be the sourcing from sources with lower variable costs that contribute to
the export status through lowering unit costs, and thus the competitiveness of
the good; however, using the lagged variable of export status does not change the
results.17
My proxy for horizontal FDI (SIMILAR PRODUCT) yields the expected re-
sults, as it is positive and statistically signi￿cant for the use of vertical integration,
especially foreign vertical integration, which I interpret as an indication that these
corporate groups have established plants producing intermediate inputs, which it
delivers to several ￿nal producers around the world, and as such captures a vol-
ume e⁄ect that is not captured in the theoretical model, nor by the productivity
e⁄ect in the empirical analysis. The e⁄ect on domestic outsourcing is negative and
statistically signi￿cant, and for foreign outsourcing it is positive, but not signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent from zero. This could also be coherent with the hypothesis that
international conglomerates centralize their sourcing, both in vertically integrated
plants and the inputs they contract at arm￿ s-length. The e⁄ects of CAPITAL
INTENSITY and R&D INTENSITY on ￿rms￿sourcing behavior is a bit harder
to interpret, but there seem to be some e⁄ects going on, and they should be used
to control for whatever mechanisms this might be. In the theoretical model, ￿rms
will always invest for, and produce the optimal quantity of goods, and therefore
16A random e⁄ects probit regression shows that ￿rms with higher use of foreign outsourcing
(4.29) and foreign vertical integration (3.27) are signi￿cantly more likely to be exporters, while
domestic outsourcing (-3.20) and vertical integration (-3.05) reduces this likelihood (z-values are
shown in parentheses). A ￿xed e⁄ect logit, however, generates coe¢ cients of the same signs, but
these are not statistically signi￿cant. This is not very surprising, since I only have information
for these variables for the period 2006-08, and the low variance in export status over this period
reduces the sample to a mere 442 observations.
17Other concerns could be that there is collinearity between productivity and export status,
as argued theoretically by Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) and others. However,
the correlation between the two is a mere 0.04, so collinearity should not be a problem in the
econometrical analysis.
125always produce at full capacity. The uncertainties of the real world are naturally
not compatible with this, as shown in the coe¢ cient for the variable CAPACITY
UTILIZATION. This variable has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the use of
domestic outsourcing (NO), and a negative e⁄ect on the use of domestic vertical
integration (NI). My interpretation of this is that outsourcing domestically is the
sourcing option with the lowest ￿xed cost, and is therefore a natural choice of
sourcing in order to cover a temporal increase in demand. The negative e⁄ect on
vertical integration could re￿ ect its lack of ￿ exibility, and thus the counter-cyclical
intensity in the use of this sourcing option.
Table 4 shows the results for using two alternative measures of productivity:
output per worker and value added per worker. These results are shown in Table
4.
Regressions (5)-(9) use output per worker as the productivity measure, whereas
regressions (10)-(13) use value added per worker. The results are qualitatively very
similar to the results from regressions (1)-(4), using the Olley-Pakes productivity
measures as the main explanatory variable. The coe¢ cients for the alternative
productivity measures are also statistically signi￿cant in most cases. As the pro-
ductivity estimates in Table 4 are not very sophisticated, while the Olley-Pakes
productivity estimates are arguably the best estimates methodologically, and since
they are also the most commonly used in the literature, I will use these estimates
as my productivity variable in the following.
126127The above testing of Predictions 1-4 indicates that the model may very well
describe an important mechanism for ￿rms￿use of di⁄erent sourcing options. In
the motivation for this paper, however, I argued for the relevance of sourcing
strategies, i.e. the combination of all the sourcing options the ￿rm decides to
use. The theoretical model generates clear predictions on which such strategies
are compatible with the model, and also in which order they can be ranked by
￿rm productivity. In the model, there can, depending on the form of t(!), be 10
di⁄erent sourcing strategies, ranked by productivity of the ￿rms that will use them,
with the most productive ￿rms choosing SI and the least productive choosing
NO:18
Sourcing strategy Rank Percentage of ￿rms
SI 1 0:2%
SO + SI 2 0:2%
NO + SO + SI 3 4:9%
SO 4 1:6%
NI + SO 5 0:1%
NO + SO 5 26:9%
NO + NI + SO 7 5:8%
NI 8 0:8%
NO + NI 9 4:7%
NO 10 45:3%
A ￿rst examination of these possible strategies reveal that they cover only 10 of
the 15 strategies that could possibly exist in the real world. However, these 10
strategies account for 90.7% of the strategies that the ￿rms in the sample actually
choose. Firms with more than 200 employees are overrepresented in the sample,
and splitting the sample in large and small ￿rms along this demarcation criteria,
I ￿nd that the 10 sourcing strategies permitted by the model account for 84.0% of
the strategies used by large ￿rms, and 93.3% of the strategies chosen by the small
￿rms. The most important strategy that is excluded by the theoretical model,
18Not all these strategies can potentially occur for a speci￿c function form of t(!), but all
strategies are possible under one form or another of t(!). The ranking along ￿rm productivity
is unambiguous, with the exception of the ranking of NISO and NOSO, as they will never both
occur for a speci￿c function form of t(!). These two strategies are thus ranked as equal on the
productivity scale.
128is NONISOSI, sourcing from all the possible sourcing options. This strategy is
used by 3.1% of the ￿rms in the data. In the subsamples, this value is 9.1% for
the large ￿rms, and 0.8% among the small ￿rms. I thus argue that the sourcing
options that are not rationally used, according to the theoretical model, are not
commonly used among ￿rms in my data sample either, with the exception of some
of the largest ￿rms that use all four sourcing options. Further, the model also
predicts a ranking of these most-used sourcing strategies along the productivity
axis. Based on this theoretical ranking, an ordered logit regression on sourcing
strategy coded inversely to the one shown above should show a positive coe¢ cient
for the productivity measures. The result of such a regression is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Sourcing strategies
Indeed, the coe¢ cients for productivity in regression (14) show the expected sign,
as predicted by the theoretical model. This indicates that ￿rms sort into the
129di⁄erent sourcing strategies based on their productivity.
One question in the debates around the "disintegration of production" has been
the degree of o⁄shoring, the moving of jobs out of the country. There are many
reasons this topic raises debates, as it is easy to understand that such movement
of tasks to foreign countries will a⁄ect local labor markets, although as mentioned
above, the literature is ambiguous about how it will a⁄ect wage levels. In regres-
sion (15) I group together the share of intermediate inputs that the ￿rms buy
from both related and unrelated ￿rms outside of Spain. Not surprisingly, and in
accordance with previous studies, these regressions show that larger, more produc-
tive ￿rms o⁄shore more tasks and import more intermediate inputs from abroad
than less productive, smaller ￿rms. Again, the e⁄ect seems to be concave. In the
next regression, (16), I run a similar regression, but on the sum of the shares of
intermediate inputs bought from vertically integrated plants both in Spain and
abroad. Also this relationship seems to be positive, but concave; larger, more
productive ￿rms use more inputs from vertically integrated plants. Also the signs
of the control variables seem to be consistent with the above interpretations from
the regressions on individual sourcing options.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a theoretical model for ￿rms￿sourcing decisions
that incorporates dimensions from the productivity-driven sorting mechanism from
Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), as well as the task-trading from Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). Combining this with some ￿xed costs associated with each task
I get a framework where ￿rms sort into sourcing strategies, as in the simultaneous
use of several sourcing options, both domestically and abroad. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the ￿rst sourcing model to generate such rich testable predic-
tions on the "disintegration of industrial production." The model also predicts the
intensity in the use of each individual sourcing option as functions of output levels
and productivity, as well as the degree of both o⁄shoring and the existence of
multi-plant ￿rms.
Testing these predictions on ￿rm-level data from Spanish ￿rms, a ￿rst obser-
vation is that around half of the ￿rms in the sample use more than one sourcing
130option, indicating the empirical relevance of models that allow for sourcing strate-
gies that use a combination of sourcing options. In the more detailed testing of
the use of sourcing options, and sourcing strategies, I ￿nd quite strong support for
the model￿ s predictions. A couple of caveats concerning the data should however
be pointed out. One is that large ￿rms are overrepresented in the sample, and
since ￿rm size is an important factor in predicting sourcing behavior, this might
a⁄ect the magnitude of the results. Although I have controlled for this as much as
possible, and ￿nd that the main results hold also for the sub-sample of only ￿rms
with less than 200 employees, it would be preferable to estimate the e⁄ects on a
more representative sample. Secondly, data on sourcing behavior have only been
recorded since 2006, and since these are long-term decisions for ￿rms, there is very
little variance over time to permit the use of econometric panel data techniques,
and causality is thus di¢ cult to establish. This implies that the relation between
higher estimated productivity and the use of foreign sourcing and vertical inte-
gration, may run both ways, and even be a self-reinforcing e⁄ect. Literature on
productivity premiums among exporters discusses selection into and learning from
exporting, e⁄ects that would be highly relevant to estimate for sourcing strate-
gies as well, although at this point in time the data does not permit this line of
investigation.
Finally, the empirical testing shows that there is a strong relation between
exporting and sourcing strategies. This is not surprising, as in my model the
mechanisms that drive the use of sourcing options with higher ￿xed costs, but
lower variable costs, are exactly the same mechanisms that cause ￿rms to export
in models like that of Melitz (2003). This means that the empirical relation could
possibly just be a spurious one, although I ￿nd that hard to believe. There are
likely to be synergies between international production and international distribu-
tion, and also between lowering marginal costs of production and becoming more
competitive in the international market. Integrating my model into a Helpman
et al. (2004) type of sorting mechanism for exporting and FDI would thus be an
interesting next step in this research.
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134Appendix A1: Proof that variable costs are de-
creasing in production intensity





















It is possible to show how these change wrt x by looking at the indirect e⁄ect
of this through the cuto⁄ !￿ s. The above expressions are for situations where
0 < !NONI;!NOSO;!SONI;!SOSI < 1. If this is not the case, the expressions will
reach corner solutions. Consider for example the possible situation for medium-
sized ￿rms if !NOSO < 0 < 1 < !SONI. In this case these ￿rms will source
all intermediate inputs through foreign outsourcing, and their variable costs of
production will thus be
R 1
0 t(!)wSd!, which is independent of x. Such corner
solutions can, however, never lead to a positive relationship between x and c(s),
so by showing that
@c(s)
@x for all the interior solutions described above I will have
proved that c(s) is non-increasing in x for all possible values of x, including corner
solutions.


































where T (!) =
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x | {z }
>0
< 0:
Since t(!) is monotonically increasing in !, the same must be true for the inverse















x > 0 and
@!NONI
@x < 0 it must be the case that
@cs(s)
@x < 0, and I have
shown that costs are monotonically decreasing in x for small ￿rms. Following the
above approach, it is also easy to show that the same must be the case for medium






































































































































































I have thus shown that
@c(s)
@x ￿ 08x.
Appendix A2: Production intensity and produc-
tivity
The ￿rms￿pro￿t function is given by
￿ = A
1￿￿ (￿x)
￿ ￿ c(x)x ￿ f (x);


























The numerator in this expression is always positive, whereas the denominator
contains both positive and some potentially negative elements. For the FOC to














which is simply the denominator in the expression above. This implies that in
optimum, an increase in productivity will increase the optimal production intensity,
and dx
d￿ > 0. There will be a unique optimum if the SOC holds for all values of x.
Intuitively, this will be the case if the reduction in marginal costs from an increase
in x is never larger than the reduction in marginal revenue from the same change
in x. In such a situation, a marginal increase in x would lead to a drop in variable
costs of production su¢ ciently large to cause an even larger increase in x, and thus
lead to a self-reinforcing process of falling costs and increasing production. If there
are never such self-reinforcing e⁄ects, @2￿
@x2 < 08x, and the equilibrium is unique.
Appendix A3: Mapping of the sourcing strategies
With four di⁄erent sourcing options (NO, NI, SO, SI) there should exist six di⁄er-
ent t(!)-loci. However, the variable costs of both NI and SI are indi⁄erent to t(!),
which means that for a given production intensity, one of these will be preferred




wN￿wS =) NI ￿ SI
and vice versa. This leaves me with ￿ve t(!)-loci, which should imply a total
of ten cuto⁄-values for x. Again there is a special case, as it turns out that
!SOSI > !NONI 8 x. There are thus nine x-cuto⁄s that determine the rankings of
t(!)-loci, plus xNISI that determine when NI ￿ SI. The complete list of these
138x-values in descending order is:
















(wN ￿ wS)(wN + wS)











wN (wN ￿ wS)











wS (wN ￿ wS)
:
Category x
1 xNOSONOSI > x
2 xNOSOSONI > x > xNOSONOSI
3 xSONINOSI > x > xNOSOSONI
4 xNOSINONI > x > xSONINOSI
5 x > xNOSINONI
This implies that for the smallest ￿rms with x < xNOSONOSI it will be the case
that
This unambiguously determines the complete order to be
!NOSO > !NOSI > !SOSI > !NONI > !SONI:
For a given production intensity x, this ranking de￿nes six regions along the !-axis.
Below I have shown these regions for ascending ! values. Each column shows all
pairwise rankings of sourcing options for that given range of ! values.19 In each
column there is one sourcing option that dominates all other sourcing options, and
will be the one the ￿rm will use for that range of tasks. The chosen sourcing option
19NI ￿ SI 8 ! since x < xNISI
139is shown in the last row of the table.
For these smallest ￿rms, we can thus see that domestic outsourcing and domestic
vertical integration will be the only sourcing options ever used. Further, the table
shows that the cuto⁄between the two sourcing options is, quite naturally, !NONI.
Similar tables for the other four production intensity categories are shown below.
Sourcing when xNOSONOSI < x < xNONISONI:
Sourcing when xNONISONI < x < xNOSISONI:
140Sourcing when xNOSISONI < x < xNOSINONI:
Sourcing when xNOSINONI < x:
Together, these ￿ve tables and the cuto⁄production intensities show all the infor-
mation needed to draw Figure 1 in the paper.
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